Abstract. Masking is a popular countermeasure against side channel attacks. Many practical works use Boolean masking because of its simplicity, ease of implementation and comparably low performance overhead. Some recent works have explored masking schemes with higher algebraic complexity and have shown that they provide more security than Boolean masking at the cost of higher overheads. In particular, masking based on the inner product was shown to be practical, albeit not efficient, for a small security parameter, and at the same time provable secure in the domain of leakage resilient cryptography for a large security parameter. In this work we explore a security versus efficiency tradeoff and provide an improved and tweaked inner product masking. Our practical security evaluation shows that it is less secure than the original inner product masking but more secure than Boolean masking. Our performance evaluation shows that our scheme is only four times slower than Boolean masking and more than two times faster than the original inner product masking. Besides the practical security analysis we prove the security of our scheme and its masked operations in the threshold probing model.
Introduction
Side-channel attacks (SCA) are a well-known threat to embedded security. They allow to perform key recovery attacks on cryptographic implementations by analyzing physical properties present in embedded devices. Examples are execution time [22] , power consumption [23] or electromagnetic emanations [16, 30] . SCA exploit the fact that these measurable quantities are statistically dependent on the intermediate variables being processed in the implementation. One of the most popular and well-studied countermeasures for block ciphers are data randomization techniques, commonly known as masking [5, 19] . These aim to conceal all intermediate variables of a cryptographic computation with random data.
The core principle of higher-order masking is to split any sensitive variable S into n random and secret shares. The way in which such a splitting is made determines the masking type or the masking function. Typical examples are Boolean masking (S = S 1 + . . . + S n ) or multiplicative masking (S = S 1 × . . . × S n ). A masking scheme additionally defines a set of operations to process the n shares while preserving the correctness of computations and ensuring that intermediate values remain independent of the sensitive variables. The security order d of a masking scheme is defined as the smallest number of d + 1 intermediate values that, considered jointly, are not independent of a sensitive variable S. While a d-th order masking scheme can always be broken by a d + 1-th order SCA that exploits the leakage of d + 1 intermediate values in the protected implementation jointly, the design of higher-order masking countermeasures is of practical interest due to two main reasons. First, the data complexity of applying a d + 1-th order SCA grows exponentially on d given a sufficient amount of noise [5, 27, 11] . And second, the computational complexity of searching for the d + 1 leakage points grows combinatorially in the attack order [32] .
Related Work
Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [21] were first to introduce a higher-order Boolean masking scheme tailored to hardware contexts by showing how to protect a circuit over F 2 composed of NOT and AND gates. They also proved the security of their construction against an adversary capable of probing d wires of the protected circuit. The framework introduced in [21] (commonly known as the ISW probing model) provides a sound basis to determine the security of higherorder masking schemes, as security against d probes directly implies d-th order SCA resistance [7] . Ishai et al. proved their construction secure in the probing model for n ≥ 2d + 1.
Rivain and Prouff [33] extended the ideas of [21] to any finite field. They devised a series of provable secure operations in the masked domain and applied them to efficiently secure AES implementations in software contexts. To protect the most complex part of AES, namely the nonlinear part of the S-box, they employed a power function devised to minimize the number of costly multiplications. Although the original claim in [33] was that n = d + 1 shares could provide d-th order provable security, Coron et al. [9] have shown that in fact n ≥ 2d + 1 shares are necessary. Despite this, the Boolean scheme due to Rivain and Prouff remains one of the most efficient generic higher-order constructions in the literature.
Further work has focused on improving the performance of higher-order Boolean masking for the most challenging part of cipher implementations, namely nonlinear transformations. Genelle et al. [17] proposed a method to securely switch between Boolean and multiplicative masking at any order. The technique is particularly suitable to protect implementations of the AES, as it enables to switch the mask type before and after the S-box power function. Carlet et al. [4] built on the ideas of [33] to secure any look-up table using Lagrange interpolation. Coron [7] introduced a method to mask look-up tables at any order.
Generic higher-order countermeasures using other types of masking have also been investigated. Because of their higher algebraic complexity, observation of the shares results in significantly less information leakage than for the Boolean type given the same security order d and low levels of noise. Along these lines, von Willich [37] proposed affine masking in which variables are encoded as S = mask 1 ×S +mask 2 . Fumaroli et al. [15] analyzed this type of masking and showed how it can be used to secure AES software implementations, in which the S-box is protected by means of table re-computation. The authors achieve performance results that are comparable to those of Boolean masking, but the affine masking construction has not been generalized to higher security orders d > 1.
Another proposal for a different type of masking is polynomial masking. Independently introduced by Prouff and Roche [29] as well as by Goubin and Martinelli [18] , it employs Shamir's secret-sharing [34] and secure multi-party computation techniques [2] . In particular, a sensitive variable S is associated to a polynomial of degree d of the form
where the a i are random secret coefficients. An encoding of a variable S is performed by selecting n distinct nonzero elements α i and evaluating S i = P S (α i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. The variable S is then represented in the masked domain as the combination of n pairs (α i , S i ), of which only the S i are secret. The variable S can be reconstructed as S = n i=1 S i × β i , where the coefficients β i are computed from the public α i . Although based on the same masking type, the schemes due to Prouff and Roche [29] and by Goubin and Martinelli [18] have notable differences. In particular, the construction of [29] is specifically designed to prove d-th order security in the presence of glitches [24] , while the construction of [18] is designed to achieve "classical" d-th order SCA resistance. Both schemes use an algorithm to compute the product of two masked variables that is based on the secure multiparty computation scheme due to Ben-Or et al. [2] , and that requires n ≥ 2d + 1. The authors of [18] additionally propose a more efficient algorithm that reduces the number of required shares to n ≥ d + 1. Despite this improvement, the complexity of both multiplication algorithms is O(n 3 ) in the number of shares, as opposed to e.g. Boolean masking which achieves O(n 2 ). A recent work by Coron et al. [8] has improved this complexity toÕ(n 2 ) by using DFT for fast polynomial evaluation.
A different approach is followed by Balasch et al. [1] . They introduce IP masking based on the inner product construction of Dziembowski and Faust [12] . A masked variable is represented by 2n shares in the form of two random vectors (L,R) of n elements each such that S equals the inner product of L and R. The authors propose an efficient multiplication algorithm with complexity O(n 2 ), thus similar to Boolean constructions, while achieving significantly less information leakage than other types of masking at the same security order d for low noise levels. Despite these advantages, the addition and refreshing algorithms are more complex (larger constant terms) than their counterparts in the Boolean and polynomial masking schemes.
Overall, the applicability of higher-order masking techniques other than Boolean is still an open question. Coron et al. [8] have identified a first-order flaw in the faster multiplication routine of the polynomial masking construction of Goubin and Martinelli [18] . Similarly, a first-order leakage in the refresh and addition operations of IP Masking [1] has been pointed out by Prouff et al. [28] . And the polynomial masking scheme by Prouff and Roche [29] has been shown to be rather demanding when implemented in hardware [25] , mostly due to its security guarantees even in the presence of glitches. Eventually, and despite their potential, higher-order countermeasures based on masking constructions other than Boolean do not appear to be ready for practical applications.
Our Contributions
In this work, we develop several improvements to the original IP masking scheme proposed in [1] .
New IP masking scheme. Our first contribution is to introduce a few tweaks in the definition of the masking function that result in significant performance improvements. Similar to the original IP masking, a masked variable is represented by 2n shares in the form of two vectors (L,R). Our first change is to let L be a public value, allowing us to reduce the number of secret shares from 2n to n. As a result we fix L to a constant value in such a way that all variables involved in computations are masked under the same L, but different R. Additionally, we require that the first public element of L is L 1 = 1. The combination of these changes results in great efficiency improvements for all operations in the masked domain. In particular, the complexity of the addition and refreshing algorithms becomes comparable to those of Boolean and polynomial masking schemes. An important side benefit of our tweaks is that the first-order leakage identified in [28] on the refresh and addition algorithms no longer applies.
Practical security analysis. Our second contribution is to evaluate the impact of our tweaks and compare the security of the new masking type with other higher-order masking functions. We use the mutual information between the secret variable and the leakage of all shares of its masked representation as figure of merit. Our evaluation shows that our new masking function leaks more than IP masking, which is expected because L is now public, but it leaks roughly one order of magnitude less than Boolean masking with the same security order d. It also leaks similar to polynomial masking with the same security order d.
Security in the threshold-probing model. As a third contribution we prove the security of our improved scheme in the probing model introduced by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [21] . Our security analysis shows that our construction is secure against d probes, when n ≥ 2d + 1. We emphasize that this is the same security threshold that can be achieved by most other higher-order masking schemes [21, 33, 7] . Notice that only for the multiplication operation we require that n ≥ 2d + 1. For all other operations including the masking function, it is sufficient to set n > d.
Efficient implementation. Finally, our fourth contribution is to determine the performance of our masking scheme in securing a block cipher implementation. Similar to [1] , we opt to protect a software implementation of AES-128 on an embedded 8-bit controller and we compare our results to other d-th order masking schemes. The results show that our improved construction allows to halve the execution time with respect to the original IP masking scheme, and to reduce the gap with Boolean masking from approximately a factor 10 to a factor 4.
Notation
In the following we denote by K a field of characteristic 2 and we represent field elements with upper-case letters. For instance, S ∈ F 2 8 denotes an element in the AES field GF (2 8 ). Let X, Y represent two vectors over K n . Field elements in vectors are addressed with subindex i, e.g. X i and Y i , respectively. The standard inner product function over K is denoted as X,
The matrixÂ = X × Y over K n×n is defined as the tensor product of two vectors X and Y . Field elements in a matrix are addressed as A i,j , where i and j represent row and column position, respectively. IfÂ,B are matrices over K n×n , then we denote by Â ,B the inner product of matrices when we view them as vectors of n 2 field elements, i.e. i j A i,j × B i,j . For an integer n we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}.
Our Construction
Our scheme improves on the IP masking by Balasch et al. [1] based on the inner product construction of Dziembowski and Faust [12] . A variable S ∈ K in IP masking is encoded by using two vectors (L, R) of n elements with L ← K\{0} n and R ← K n . Note that the elements of the vector L are by definition different than zero.
Our new masking function has three major differences with respect to [1] . First, the vector L is computed once and kept as a constant parameter. This implies that all masked variables employed in our scheme share a unique vector L. Second, we let the vector L be a public (rather than secret) parameter. In other words, we assume the elements L i can be known to the adversary. And third, we constrain the selection of the first element of L such that L 1 = 1. The number of shares that are kept secret in our masking function is therefore determined by the security parameter n, which corresponds to the number of elements in R. We show in the remainder of this section that all these choices allow to significantly reduce the complexity of operations in the masked domain.
The procedure IPSetup n depicted in Algorithm 1 details the initialization steps of our masking construction. Given n and a field description K, the algorithm returns a public vector L and a public matrixL. The latter corresponds to the tensor product L × L, and its pre-computation allows us to speed-up multiplications in the masked domain. One can imagine IPSetup n is executed before system roll-out during device personalization, e.g. in parallel with key generation. The sub-routine randNonZero() returns a nonzero element in the field K. More precisely, it samples uniformly at random from K\{0}.
Algorithm 2 depicts the steps to convert a variable S ∈ K into the masked domain. This routine, denoted by IPMask L , is parametrized by a vector L resulting from executing IPSetup n . The sub-routine rand() returns a randomly
random vector L and tensor productL = L×L 1: L1 = 1; 2: for i = 2 to n do 3: Li ← randNonZero(K); 4: end for 5: for i = 1 to n do 6:
for j = 1 to n do 7:
Li,j = Li × Lj; 8: end for 9: end for selected element in the field K. This function is called n − 1 times in order to set the values of R 2 . . . R n . The value R 1 is then computed in order to obtain a valid masking of S under the inner product construction.
Operations in the Masked Domain
We propose three main algorithms of our masking construction: IPRefresh L , IPAdd L and IPMult L,L . For an implementation of the AES (as detailed in Sect. 6) it is advantageous to further have a dedicated squaring routine in the masked domain. For this reason we also propose an additional IPSquare L algorithm.
The routine IPRefresh L is depicted in Algorithm 3. It consists of two steps. First, the computation of a vector A orthogonal to L. And second, the addition of A to R to obtain a fresh vector R . The correctness of the algorithm is easy to prove:
The routine IPAdd L is illustrated in Algorithm 4. Because all variables in our construction are masked with a common vector L, the output vector T can be simply obtained by adding the input vectors R and Q.
Note that the IPAdd L algorithm is similar to that of Boolean masking constructions, yet our type of masking has higher algebraic complexity. This im-
provement is a direct consequence of letting L be a public and constant parameter.
The multiplication routine IPMult L,L depicted in Algorithm 5 is the most involved operation. Our starting point is the masked multiplication of [1] , albeit with some efficiency improvements. First, since both input operands are masked under the same vector L, the computation of the matrixL is not dependent on the input operands. Consequently, we can save n 2 field multiplications by pre-computing this matrix during IPSetup n . And second, because the first component of L is set to L 1 = 1, a constant b can be added to a masking (L, R) by simply computing the new masking as (L, (R 1 + b, R 2 , . . . , R n )).
Algorithm 5 Multiply masked values
In order to keep the d-th order security for n = 2d + 1 throughout the whole execution of IPMult L,L , it is important that operations in lines 1 and 4 are computed in a certain way as depicted in Table 1 . In particular, the intermediate values ∆ j are calculated by aggregating the intermediate products of elements in matricesÂ andL in a column-wise fashion. In contrast, the values β i are computed by processing the elements of the matricesL andB row by row. This important difference in the way we compute the sums is crucial for the security proof and, in fact, crucial for the actual security of our scheme.
For illustration purposes, consider a setting where the operations in line 1 and line 4 of IPMult L,L are computed row-wise. Let us also assume that all elements in L are L i = 1. Under these circumstances, the following attack would apply: Table 1 . Detailed description of operations in IPMult L,L .
The adversary learns the value
Assuming that Q 2 = 0 the above attack indeed recovers completely the secret value L, R . Notice that the attack even applies when L i = 1 but in this case the bias in the leaky distribution decreases with the number of shares. We prevent this attack by computing the intermediate values ∆ j as a sum of elements in a column, and β i as a sum of elements in a row. This approach effectively results in a "mixing" of the random shares and enables a security proof.
For an implementation of the AES it is beneficial to have a particularly efficient implementation of the squaring algorithm. The IPSquare L routine is illustrated in Algorithm 6.
Practical Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the information leakage of our improved IP masking scheme and compare it to that of other masking schemes that can be implemented at any order, e.g. Boolean masking, polynomial masking and the original IP masking. We follow the common approach to focus the analysis on the type of masking, i.e. to analyze the leakage of the shares of one masked variable. In practice, the leakage of the operations in the masked domain depends a lot on their (secure) implementation and on the target platform, for instance a table lookup in software versus combinational logic in hardware. We abstract from such practical issues to be able to provide a fair and meaningful comparison.
Attack Order
We begin the evaluation by deriving the minimum order for an attack against our type of masking. We say that a masking function is d-th order SCA secure, if every tuple of d or less shares is independent of the masked variable.
It is easy to see that the masking function of our improved scheme is d-th order SCA secure for n = d + 1. If we choose all elements in L equal to 1 the argument is exactly the same as for Boolean masking. It uses the same number of uniformly distributed secret shares. If we choose any L i greater than 1 we just need to observe that the field multiplication L i × R i does not introduce biases, i.e. for uniformly distributed R i the output is uniformly distributed. Recall that all elements in L are nonzero by definition.
Information Leakage
It remains to explore the security versus efficiency tradeoff of our improved scheme. It is known that a more complex algebraic relation between the shares and the masked variable provides less information leakage. We hence expect our type of masking to leak less information than the Boolean type whenever at least one L i is unequal to 1 (since the field multiplication L i × R i adds diffusion) but more than the original IP masking since L is public.
Similar to our type of masking, in polynomial masking half of the shares are distinct nonzero public constants and the other half are random and secret masks. For our evaluation of information leakage we refer only to the n secret shares. For example, polynomial masking of security order d uses n = d + 1 random and secret shares, and can theoretically be broken by a d + 1-th order SCA. Due to the similar representations of variables in the masked domain, we expect our masking function and the polynomial type to provide comparable information leakage.
We compare our type of masking with Boolean masking, polynomial masking (all of security order d using n = d + 1 secret shares) and, for completeness, with the original IP masking (of security order d = 1 using n = 4 secret shares).
Following previous work [1, 18, 29, 35, 36] we use the mutual information between a variable and the leakage of all shares of its masked representation as criterion for the comparison. We estimate the mutual information using computer simulations.
We evaluate our improved IP masking for
We evaluate Boolean masking for d ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Polynomial masking uses d + 1 public coefficients (α 1 , . . . , α d+1 ) with α i ∈ R F 2 8 \ {0} and pairwise distinct, and d + 1 shares (S 1 , . . . , S d+1 ) with S i = P S (α i ) ∈ F 2 8 [29] . We evaluate polynomial masking for d = 1 (α 1 = 3, α 2 = 7) and d = 2 (α 1 = 13, α 2 = 240, α 3 = 163). For the original IP masking we set d = 1 and let
We model the relation between a share and its physical leakage as usual in the literature: each share leaks its Hamming weight, each share leaks independently of all other shares, and each leakage is affected by independent Gaussian noise. In summary, we model the leakage of our improved scheme as Leak(L, R) = (HW(R 1 ) + n 1 , . . . , HW(R d+1 ) + n d+1 ) , the leakage of boolean masking as
the leakage of polynomial masking as
and the leakage of the original IP masking as
where the n i are independent Gaussian variables with mean zero and standard deviation σ. The mutual information between the secret variable and the leaked information is then I(S; Leak(L, R)), I(S; Leak(M 1 , . . . , M d , V ), and I(S; Leak(S 1 , . . . , S d+1 )) respectively. Recall that the mutual information is directly related to the number of measurements that a Template Attack [6] (worst case attack scenario) requires to achieve a given success probability. Standaert et al. [36] defined the relation via c · I(·; ·) −1 where the constant c is related to the success probability. Figure 1 shows plots of the mutual information (in log 10 scale) between S and the information leaked by all shares of its masked representation, over increasing noise levels σ, for all masking types considered.
The results are in line with our expectations. Our improved IP masking leaks more information than the original IP masking (in the improved scheme L is public), which illustrates the security versus efficiency tradeoff. But it leaks less than Boolean masking with the same number of shares, which is due to the more complex algebraic relation between the shares and the secret variable. The difference is particularly pronounced for low levels of noise and it seems to increase with increasing security order d. Finally, our improved IP masking and polynomial masking leak comparably. We attribute this to their similar representation of variables in the masked domain. 
Security Proof in the Probing Model
We start our security analysis with a proof in the so-called probing model introduced by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [21] . Recall that our masking scheme has the form (L, R), where L is public and R is secret and random in K n for n ∈ N being the security parameter. We will show that our construction is secure against any d probing adversary, where we assume that n = 2d + 1. That is, an adversary that can learn up to d arbitrary intermediate values computed during the execution of the masked scheme will not learn anything about the underlying secrets. Let in the following denote by P the set of intermediate values that the adversary is probing.
As a first step we show that our masking function is indeed secure against an (n − 1)-probing adversary. We use the notation A n−1 (IPMask L (S)) to describe that the adversary A obtains at most n − 1 shares of the masking. Lemma 1. For any two secrets S, S ∈ K and any (n − 1)-probing adversary A we have
where L was sampled as specified by the setup algorithm and S ← IPMask L (S) and S ← IPMask L (S ).
Proof. Notice that in our scheme the vector L is public and hence does not contribute to the security against probing attacks. Further, recall that all L i = 0, and hence all values of R contribute to the security of the masking. The proof follows by the fact that given L with all components = 0 the vector R is a perfect random additive (n − 1) out of n secret sharing scheme. More precisely, let I ⊂ [n] be the subset of indices for which A n−1 learns R i , i.e., for all i ∈ I we have that A n−1 probes R i . As |I| < n there exists at least one j ∈ [n] such that j / ∈ I. Hence, for any value S ∈ K, any choice of L and any R i such that i ∈ I there exists R j such that S = L, R .
Security of Masked Operations
We now show the security of the different operations presented in Section 3. Informally, we will show that any subset of wires P with size |P| ≤ d is independent of the underlying masked values, i.e., the probes P given to the adversary will not help the adversary in breaking the security guarantee of the underlying scheme. To this end, we will prove the security for any masked operation individually and then show that also a combination of such masked operations remains secure if the adversary obtains at most d probes in the entire circuit.
The proof is easy for the masked addition operation: probes at the inputs and outputs directly translate to probes at the underlying masked value. We will show security for the masked squaring and masked multiplication operation. The proof of the masked multiplication is rather tedious since simulating the intermediate values just from the encoded inputs and outputs of the masked operations requires careful bookkeeping.
We will denote by A d (Operation(X, Y )) the output of an adversary that probes up to d values in the execution of the operation Operation when run on masked inputs X and Y . Notice that A d may also probe the output produced by Operation, i.e., Z←Operation(X, Y ). As an example let Operation be the 
Proof. We start by a description of how to build the set I, which initially is set to I = {}. For each probe of the form R i , (R i ) 2 or (R i ) 2 × L i add the index i to I. Since the adversary can make at most d probes, we clearly have |I| ≤ d. Given the set R I and L (which is public and hence the simulator has access to it), it is easy to simulate all probes in IPSquare L (R) in a perfect way and in particular consistent with probes on the real execution of the squaring algorithm.
Security of masked multiplication. We prove the security of Algorithm 5 in the d-probing model, where n ≥ 2d + 1.
Lemma 3. For any Q, R ∈ K let Q ← IPMask L (Q) and R ← IPMask L (R). Let n be the security parameter and let d be such that 2d < n, then for any d-probing adversary A d that learns at most d probes on intermediate values produced during the masked multiplication IPMult L,L (Q, R), there exists a subset I ⊂ [n] with |I| ≤ 2d and a simulator Sim(Q |I , R |I ) such that:
Proof. To simplify the analysis we assume that L is given in its entirety a-priori to the adversary. We show that the entire distribution of the multiplication algorithm can be simulated by having access to at most 2d shares of Q and R, respectively. Since by Lemma 1 seeing 2d shares of Q and R respectively, is independent of the masked secret this proves the security of the masked multiplication operation. The set that keeps track of what values are revealed of Q, R is called I. Moreover, we keep track of two sets T and U that are needed to keep the simulation consistent. T keeps tuples (i, j) ⊂ [n] × [n] of pairs that correspond to the values of A i,j which are revealed during a probing attack, while U represents the values (i, j) of B i,j that are revealed by the attack. To simplify our analysis, we will be rather generous to the adversary and usually give him much more values than what are revealed during the actual probe of the particular intermediate value. Below we describe how to build the set I.
A. Building the sets I, U, T : In this step we initialize the sets that later are needed for the simulation. 1. Initially, we set the sets I, U, T to the empty set {}.
2.
Probes when ∆ i is computed, i.e., probes of the form A 1,i , . . . , A n,i or probes of the form ∆ i−1 + 1≤j<n L j,i ×A j,i : Add the index (1, i) , . . . , (n, i) into the set T . 3. Probes of the form B i,j or sums of the form j L i,j ×B i,j : We distinguish two cases: (a) For i > 1: Add the index (i, 1), . . . , (i, n) to the set U.
(b) For i = 1: Add the index (i, j) to the set U. The above two cases capture the fact that for row i = 1 of the matrix B we do not compute the sum of values B 1,j , i.e., of the first row of the matrixB. Additionally, for each such (i, j) that has been added to U: if (i, j) is in T , then add i, j to I. 4. Probes of the form Q i , R j and Q i ×R j : For probes of the form Q i resp. R j add i resp. j to I. For a probe of the form Q i × R j add the indices i, j to I.
B. Sampling variables independently of probes:
We start by sampling some of the values a-priori before we answer the actual probing queries. We will later take care that all probes are answered consistently with the values sampled in this initial step. 1. Choose β 2 , . . . , β n uniformly at random. Notice that this allows to compute all the potential values that appear in the sum when computing the value b -including the value b. 2. Sample ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n−1 uniformly at random and set ∆ 0 = ∆ n = 0. C. Simulating the probes: We next show how to answer the probing queries of the adversary given all values {Q i } i∈I and {R i } i∈I , and the values ∆ i , β j sampled in Step B. 
Notice that this is possible since the relevant values of Q i and R j are given in {Q i } i∈I and {R i } i∈I and A i,j has been assigned in Step C2. (c) If (i, j) is in U, but (i, j) is not in T , then we sample B i,j uniformly at random subject to the constraint that β i = j L i,j × B i,j . Notice that the later requirement only is needed for i > 1. The value B 1,j is chosen uniformly at random.
We will show below that (1) the simulation has the same distribution as the real execution of the masked multiplication operation (second claim below), and (2) we argue that the size of the set I has always cardinality |I| ≤ 2d (first claim below). Putting these two claims together proves the lemma.
In the following analysis we denote by u the number of probes corresponding to Step A2, by v the number of probes corresponding to Step A3 and by w the number of probes corresponding to Step A4.
Claim. Let n ∈ N be the security parameters and d be the number of probes such that 2d < n. Then, |I| ≤ 2d.
Proof. Observe that the simulator adds elements to I only in Step A3 and
Step A4. As each probe in Step A4 leads to adding at most two elements to I and w ≤ d, this directly implies |I| ≤ 2d if probes appear only in Step A4. It remains to analyze the number of elements we add to I for each probe done in
Step A3. The analysis for Step A3 is a little more involved as the number of elements added to I depends on both u (number of probes in Step A2) and v (number of probes in Step A3). Recall that for each probe of Step A2 that is within the i-th column we add all indices (1, i) , . . . , (n, i) to T that correspond to the elements in the i-th column of the matrixÂ, while for each probe in
Step A3 we add all indices (i, 1), . . . , (i, n) to U that correspond to the i-th row of the matrixB (except for the first row, but this does not matter for the rest of the analysis). Furthermore, recall that each B i,j is computed from A i,j . Depending on the values added to T and U, in Step A3 we will add all i, j to I where (i, j) is an "intersection" between the columns and rows mentioned above. Unfortunately, it is easy to see that for u columns and v = d − u − w rows we may have more than 2d intersections. 3 The good news is, however, that many elements will be added multiple times to I, hence not increasing the size of I.
More precisely, for a query in the i-th row from
Step A3, we add the index i into the set I. Additionally, for each such query we add index of the column at which we have an intersection from a query in the j-th column. The main observation is that for each row the indices added by the intersections with the columns are the same. In other words, for each i the tuples (i, j) have the same second component, and hence we add at most u + v ≤ d indices to I in Step A3. Combining it with the probes from Step A4, we add u + v + 2w elements to I. Since u + v + w ≤ d, we get that |I| ≤ 2d, which proves the claim.
The next claim shows that the sampling of the simulator produces the same view as a d-probing adversary obtains in a real attack against the masked multiplication operation.
Claim. For any Q, R ∈ K let Q ← IPMask L (Q) and R ← IPMask L (R), we have:
with parameters defined as in the statement of the lemma.
Proof. By the last claim we have |I| ≤ 2d. We compare the way in which the probes are answered by the simulator in Steps B and C with the real attack against the execution of the masked multiplication.
Step B: The joint distribution of values sampled at this step in the simulation is identically distributed with the real experiment even given all these values to the adversary. This is easy to see for the β i values as they are just sums of random values A i,j . Moreover, for the ∆ j values we observe that the first row is never used in computing β i (since i > 1), and hence all ∆ j for j < n can be chosen uniformly at random (they can essentially be made consistent with the view of the adversary by choosing A 1,j appropriately. The value ∆ n is fixed to 0 as we require Â ,L = 0.
Step C2: In Step B2 we sampled ∆ 1 , . . . ∆ n−1 uniformly at random and in
Step C2 we sample each column (A 1,i , . . . , A n,i ) of the matrixÂ uniformly at random such that
. This implies that all A i,j for j ∈ [n] are chosen uniformly at random 4 . For the last column of the matrix we require that ∆ n + ∆ n−1 = ∆ n−1 = j∈[n] L j,n × A j,n , which guarantees that Â ,L = 0 as required by the protocol. It remains to show that the choice of the A i,j values produced by the simulator is consistent with the simulator's choice of the values β i . To this end observe that after a probing attack at most u ≤ d columns of the matrixÂ have been assigned, i.e., the values in n − d columns remain un-assigned. As β i = a + j A i,j for some fixed value a = Q i × L i × R the value β i is distributed uniformly at random even given all values ∆ i and all values A i,j that haven been assigned previously. Notice that this is the case since (a) there is at least one column in the matrixÂ that has not been assigned yet, and (b) the scheme never computes j A 1,j as β 1 is not needed for the computation. More precisely, let j * be the column that is unassigned after the assignment of the values above, then each β i is perfectly hidden by A i,j * and we can choose A 1,j * in such a way that the column is consistent with ∆ j * . This concludes the analysis of Step C2.
Step C3: To answer the queries on Q i , R j and Q i × R j we use the values given in {Q i } i∈I and {R i } i∈I . To argue that this gives us the right distribution (independent of Q and R), we first recall that by the last claim |I| ≤ 2d. Notice that these values will always be consistent with the previously assigned values since each β i is still blinded by at least one un-assigned value A i,j * . Moreover, probes of this form (by itself) do not reveal any additional information aboutÂ.
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Step C4: We can ignore the values sampled in Step C4a as these values remain un-assigned, i.e., they are never directly probed nor are they used in the computation of other probes. The values sampled in Step C4b can be computed from the values that have been assigned previously (since (i, j) was in U and T which implies that i, j ∈ I), and, hence will not affect the joint distribution. Notice that in this step we will always only fix a subset of the B i,j elements in the i-th row, because there are at most u ≤ d probes in
Step A2 (which lead to adding tuples (i, j) to T ). The remaining values for the i-th row are chosen as defined in Step C4c. That is, in the simulation we choose these values uniformly at random such that β i = j L i,j × B i,j taking into account the previously assigned values for B i,j from Step C4b. By the requirement given in Step C4c our choice of B i,j is consistent with the choice of β i . It remains to argue why the simulator's choice is also consistent with the matrixÂ as sampled in Step C2 and with ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n . To this end, observe that the simulator only samples B i,j according to Step C4c if A i,j has not been revealed previously (i.e., it was in a column ofÂ that has never been probed). Hence, indeed B i,j is uniformly distributed (since it is blinded by the random and unknown value A i,j ). Finally, it remains to argue that the choice of B i,j is also consistent with the choice of ∆ j from Step B. Recall that for values B i,j for which (i, j) ∈ U, but not in T this implies that the j-th row has not been queried. Moreover, we know since v ≤ d there are at least n − v > d rows that have not been probed. Hence, there exists some B k,j and A k,j that have not been assigned during the experiment (i.e., they belong to Step C4a). Such values A k,j were never used in the experiment and can always be chosen such that the total sum is consistent with ∆ j .
The above description concludes the proof.
Putting together the above two claims we obtain the statement of the lemma.
This completes the analysis of the security of individual masked operations. In the next section we briefly argue about security of masked composed algorithms.
Security of General Masked Computation
In [21] , we only provide an informal analysis of d-probing security of composed masked operations. To this end, observe that both in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 the simulation only depends on at most 2d elements of the outputs of the masked operation. As an example consider the masked multiplication that outputs the vector T and assume that T is input for a squaring algorithm. If the adversary probes d 1 intermediate values in the multiplication operation, then it is easy to see that the simulation described in Lemma 3 depends on at most 2d 1 shares of T . Moreover, the masked multiplication operation guarantees that even given Q and R entirely, the output T is a uniformly and independently chosen maskings of Q × R. This means that for the simulation of the adjacent squaring algorithm the simulator starts with a masking of which 2d 1 shares are already known. Since according to Lemma 2 the simulator requires d 2 elements of its inputs to simulate the probes in the squaring operation, the simulator will learn additionally d 2 elements of T . Since 2d 1 + d 2 < n this shows security of the simple composed circuit consisting of a multiplication followed by a masked squaring operation. The above argument can easily be extended to arbitrary complicated masked algorithms consisting of many masked operations.
Another difficulty occurs when the adversary can run the masked algorithm multiple times and in each execution he may observe d intermediate values. For instance, one may think of a masked AES algorithm running with a masked key K. Notice that this setting is different from the setting of composed masked computation described above since now the adversary can observe qd intermediate values, where q is the number of executions that the masked algorithm is run. As in earlier work [21, 7] the problem of a continuous probing adversary, i.e., an adversary that learns up to d intermediate values in each execution of the masked AES algorithm, can be addressed by a key refresh algorithm. If (L, R) denotes the masking of a key byte of the AES, then the masking of this key byte can be refreshed by running the Algorithm 3 n times consecutively. In other words, the key refresh algorithm takes as input R 0 := R and for i = 1, . . . n proceeds as follows: Compute R i = IPRefresh L (R i−1 ) and output R = R n . Clearly, since we execute IPRefresh L n times and the adversary can probe only d < n intermediate values there must exist at least one execution of IPRefresh L (R i−1 ) that does not leak at all. Hence the mask of R is completely refreshed. This enables us to transform our result to a continuous probing adversary without any additional loss, when in each execution the adversary can learn up to d values (where 2d < n).
We notice that the fact that IPRefresh L is repeated multiple times to refresh the masking of the key is not only an artefact of the security proof. In fact, it is easy to show that for natural implementations of IPRefresh L the scheme becomes insecure. To illustrate this, we present a simple attack against a more efficient key refresh algorithm that executes IPRefresh L only a single time. For simplicity, let us assume that L = (1, . . . , 1), i.e., the vector is the all-1 vector. Notice that in this case the inner product masking function is identical to the Boolean masking used, e.g., in [33] . Let us assume that A is sampled in IPRefresh L in the following way:
1. Let t 0 = 0. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1 repeat the following: (a) Sample A i uniformly at random in
Consider a masked implementation of the AES that at the end of the execution refreshes its key shares by applying a single execution of the IPRefresh L algorithm. We now describe an attack that allows to recover the key with only 2 probes in each execution of the masked AES implementation. Notice that we consider the full probing model [7] , where the adversary can move its probes between consecutive rounds of execution. Our attack does not apply in the restricted probing model [7] . We denote by K i the masking of the key k at the beginning of the i-th round, i.e., for all i we have L, K i = k. We have K 0 being the initially shared key. Moreover, we denote by A i the vector that is used in the i-th execution of the masked AES implementation for refreshing, i.e.,
1. First execution of the masked AES: Probe K We will now describe how to compute k from the above described probes. Suppose at the beginning of the i-th round (i.e., before carrying out the probes in this round) the adversary knows
. We show how with the probes described above he can compute i j=1 K i j . To this end, notice that:
where the second and the third term the adversary knows from the probes in the i-th round and the first term he knows by assumption. Hence, by induction it is easy to argue that the above attack allows to recover the secret key k.
Performance Evaluation
We have applied our masking scheme to protect a software implementation of AES-128 encryption. For illustrative purposes we have opted to develop two implementations employing n = 2 and n = 3 shares, respectively. This choice not only enables a better comparison with other higher-order schemes, but also allows us to gain insight into how the performance scales with an increasing number of shares.
Our target platform is a legacy AVR ATMega163 microcontroller. This device has an 8-bit architecture and offers 32 general purpose registers, 1 024 bytes of internal SRAM and 16 KBytes of Flash memory. Our implementation is aimed for speed. To this end, we have written all operations in assembly code and made use of lookup tables whenever possible.
The lowest implementation layer corresponds to arithmetic in the field F 2 8 . Field addition is very efficient, as it can be performed in one clock cycle via the native XOR instruction. Field multiplication on the other hand is not part of the AVR instruction set, and we opt to implement it using log and alog tables [38] . Because this method contains a conditional statement, i.e. check if any of the operands equals zero, realizing it with a constant flow of instructions requires in our implementation 22 cycles. Field squaring -as well as raisings to the power of four and sixteen -are implemented by means of lookup tables. Our platform does not have internal support for generating random numbers, as opposed to e.g. JavaCard smart cards. For the sake of completeness and testing, random numbers are provided externally and stored in memory.
The public parameters L andL are initialized at setup time and kept constant for each execution of the cipher. Consequently, they are hardcoded in Flash memory. Note that for n = 2, there exist 2 8 possible vectors A orthogonal to L satisfying A, L = 0. These vectors can be as well precomputed during initialization and stored in Flash memory as a look-up table T satisfying T (A 2 ) = A 1 = L 2 × A 2 . During IPRefresh L , a value A 2 is picked at random and the corresponding value A 1 is looked up as T (A 2 ). This allows to improve the efficiency of IPRefresh L at the cost of storing 256 bytes in Flash memory.
The main difficulty of applying our masking scheme (and any other) to AES consists in efficiently masking its nonlinear part, i.e. the SubBytes transformation. In software contexts it is common to implement this transformation by means of a lookup table. While there exist techniques in the literature to protect table lookups at higher-order, e.g. [7] , these are rather costly in terms of performance and storage. Alternatively, one can compute the full SubBytes step by using the following equation over F 2 8 for a given input state byte X:
This equation involves multiple field operations (particularly costly multiplications) in order to calculate the different powers of X. It is therefore not very suitable if one aims for an efficient implementation. We therefore follow a different path as already done in [1] , i.e. we carry out both steps of the SubBytes transformation (inverse and affine transformation) separately. Specifically, we first compute the field inverse by using the following power function:
As discussed in [33] , this equation can be efficiently carried out with only 4 multiplications and 7 squarings. For the affine transformation (linear only in F 2 ) we employ the following equation over From these equations it follows that this step can be implemented using a total of 12 masked additions and 8 masked multiplications by a constant, for each column. In [10] , the authors of AES suggest a more efficient way to compute the MixCol step by using the so-called xtime tables. Such technique takes advantage of the fact that field addition is more efficient than field multiplication in general purpose processors. Due to this, they suggest an alternative approach that requires 15 additions and 4 multiplications by 02, which can be simply performed as table lookups. We employ this technique to compute the MixCol transformation.
The performance of our protected AES-128 implementation is given in Table 2 for n = 2 and n = 3 secret shares. We have also implemented Boolean masking as proposed in [33] with the same number of secret shares. In order to enable a fair comparison, all implementations are developed on the same platform and follow the same optimization strategy. Finally, we also provide the results given in [1] for the original IP masking using n = 4 secret shares. Recall that the original IP masking was developed to provide security order d = 1 for n = 4, the same as our new scheme and Boolean masking for n = 3.
The performance results presented in Table 2 are given in clock cycles. The rightmost column shows the execution time of a full AES-128 encryption including key schedule, while the other columns depict the performances achieved for each AES building block. Table 2 . Performance evaluation (in clock cycles) of protected AES implementations. This work and Boolean with n = 2 secret shares (top); this work and Boolean with n = 3 secret shares (middle); original IP masking with n = 4 secret shares (bottom).
